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The Purpose, Praxis, and Future of Academia: 
Fichtean Approaches to Education 
 
Eri Svenson, Harper College 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Following	the	publication	of	Schulze’s	“Aenesidemus”,	which	detailed	a	skeptical	critique	of	
transcendental	idealism,	philosopher	Johann	Gottlieb	Fichte	found	himself	undergoing	an	
“intellectual	revolution”.	Having	agreed	with	many	of	Schulze’s	arguments,	he	concluded	that	
to	preserve	the	spirit	of	Kantianism	he	would	have	to	establish	a	foundationally	reworked	
conceptualization	of	it.	Fichte	emerged	from	this	process	with	a	framework	grounded	upon	the	
innovative	claim	that	we	should	regard	that	there	is	nothing	for	us	beyond	our	own	
consciousness,	which	creates	both	ourselves,	and	the	world	that	we	experience.	Furthermore,	
because	we	create	our	own	experiences,	it	is	possible	for	us	to	access	direct	knowledge	about	
our	experiences	through	our	“productive	imagination”,	and	gain	knowledge	through	
experience.	This	approach	piqued	my	interest	because	prevailing	academic	approaches	to	
knowledge	production	are	based	upon	materialist	assumptions,	Baconian	procedure,	and	
production-based	outcomes,	often	at	the	expense	of	qualitative	and	experiential	procedures.	
Wondering	if	Fichte’s	philosophies	might	be	able	to	offer	alternative,	more	balanced	
approaches	for	academia,	in	this	paper	I	participate	in	an	exploratory	process	examining	
Fichte’s	perspectives	on	pedagogy,	scholarship,	and	education.	Beginning	with	the	question:	if	
he	wrote	on	the	matter,	what	were	Fichte’s	perspectives	on	pedagogy?	I	discuss	his	relational	
pedagogy	and	the	challenges	he	experienced	balancing	his	students’	autonomy	with	his	
position	as	an	instructor.	Next,	I	ask:	did	Fichte	address	the	purpose	of	scholarship	and	
education	in	the	broader,	social	sense?	I	suggest	that	his	writings	conceptualize	scholarship	as	a	
public	good	necessary	for	the	progressive	development	of	humankind.	Finally,	I	reconsider	
Fichte’s	place	in	contemporary	academia,	wondering:	where	do	we	go	from	here	and	can	Fichte	
help	us	get	there?	Ultimately,	I	argue	for	the	relevancy	of	Fichtean	approaches	in	addressing	
the	problems	facing	academia	today.		
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I.	Imagination,	Experience,	and	Creative	Genius:	Fichte’s	“Intellectual	Revolution”		
Following	its	publication	in	1792,	G.	E	Schulze’s	“Aenesidemus”,	which	details	a	skeptic’s	
critique	of	Kant	and	Reinhold’s	transcendental	idealism,	was	forwarded	for	review	to	Kantian	
philosopher	Johann	Gottlieb	Fichte.	Though	initially	promising	that	his	analysis	would	be	
promptly	returned,	he	ultimately	spent	months	toiling	over	the	text	as	he	wrestled	with	the	
realization	that	he	found	himself	in	agreement	with	many	of	Schulze’s	critiques.	Specifically,	
among	other	claims,	“Aenesidemus”	interrogated	Kant’s	concept	of	“the	thing	in	itself”,	which	
he	used	to	describe	objects	as	they	exist	outside	the	limits	of	our	own	consciousness	and,	
consequentially,	outside	of	what	can	be	considered	knowable.	If	we	cannot	develop	knowledge	
of	truths	outside	of	our	own	consciousness,	however,	how	can	we	presume	to	know	the	thing	
in	itself	exists	at	all?	By	the	same	principle,	Schulze	also	rejected	Kant	and	Reinhold’s	argument	
that	we	can	deduce	knowledge	of	objective	realities	from	our	mind’s	representations	of	them,	
as	that	not	only	presupposes	the	existence	of	particular	objects,	but	also	an	unknowable	causal	
link	between	the	“thing	in	itself”	and	our	experiences.	In	addition,	he	critiqued	Reinhold’s	
establishment	of	consciousness	as	the	“highest	principle”	of	metaphysics,	calling	into	question	
if	philosophy	could	ever	establish	such	a	thing	in	the	first	place.	Combined,	Schulze	concluded	
that	these	problems	pointed	to	irreconcilable	contradictions	in	transcendental	idealism,	which	
had	failed	to	protect	itself	from	skeptical	critiques.	
While	Fichte	conceded	to	the	soundness	of	many	of	Schulze’s	arguments,	he	remained	
committed	to	the	continuation	of	transcendental	idealist	philosophy.	Schulze’s	critiques,	
however,	called	for	him	to	undergo	an	“intellectual	revolution”,	from	which	he	emerged	
dedicated	to	preserving	the	spirit	of	Kantianism,	but	having	concluded	that	to	succeed	in	doing	
so	he	would	have	to	develop	a	foundationally	reworked	conceptualization	of	it.	By	the	time	his	
“Review	of	Aenesidemus”	was	complete,	it	contained	an	articulation	of	the	framework	that	
would	allow	him	to	engage	in	a	thorough	undertaking	of	this	project.	Specifically,	Fichte’s	
revolution	of	thought	lead	him	to	take	the	innovative	philosophical	leap	of	arguing,	contrary	to	
Kant’s	consistent	presumption	of	the	existence	of	the	thing	in	itself,	that	we	should	in	actuality	
regard	that	there	is	nothing	for	us	beyond	consciousness.	Because	our	minds	are	the	creators	of	
both	ourselves	and	the	world	we	experience,	to	speak	of	anything	outside	of	them	contradicts	
the	spirit	of	transcendental	idealism.	Through	making	this	claim,	Fichte	deactivated	the	
contradictions	that	Schulze	had	highlighted	in	his	critique.		
From	this	innovation,	he	made	two	more	claims.	First,	that	because	we	are	producing	
experiences	for	ourselves,	we	can	develop	experimental	techniques	that	will	allow	us	to	
observe	and	curate	firsthand	knowledge	of	how	the	experiences	are	being	produced.	Through	
these	procedures,	we	can	develop	knowledge	about	representations	without	having	to	default	
to	unfalsifiable	concepts	like	“the	thing	in	itself”.	Second,	while	Fichte	agrees	that	
consciousness	is	a	poor	“highest	principle”,	he	nonetheless	defends	Reinhold’s	claim	that	we	
ought	to	develop	such	a	principle.	To	defend	against	skeptical	critiques,	however,	we	should	
not	construct	a	principle	that	demands	upon	claims	of	fact,	but	on	an	act	that	we	can	each	
experience	for	ourselves.	In	other	words,	rather	than	a	claim	of	fact	about	consciousness,	we	
should	aim	to	establish	a	replicable	“highest	principle”	that	speaks	to	the	act	of	creating	
consciousness.	For	Fichte,	this	is	necessary	because	if	philosophy	is	to	become	scientific,	it	must	
be	more	than	thought	about;	it	must	be	experientially	done.	It	is	free,	experienced	discovery,	
rather	than	discarnate	arguments,	that	should	be	at	the	heart	of	the	discipline.		
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The	establishment	of	this	framework	is	also	the	place	where	my	own	exploratory	project	
began.	From	my	first	encounter	with	Fichtean	philosophy,	I	found	myself	fascinated	with	his	
claim	that	we	should	consider	the	use	of	our	productive	imaginations	to	be	a	source	of	truth	
about	the	world,	rather	than	as	a	distraction	from	objective	analysis.	He	insists	that	it	is	possible	
for	us	to,	and	that	we	in	fact	should,	experience	the	merits	of	philosophical	conclusions	for	
ourselves,	granting	an	exceptional	amount	of	agency	to	individuals	in	the	academic	process.	
Not	only	are	we	actively	creating	our	own	conscious	experiences,	but	we	should	also	be	
involved	in	discovering	truths	about	them.	While	this	approach	to	philosophical	knowledge	
production	is	inclined	strongly	towards	the	scientific	in	its	focus	on	experimentation	and	
duplication,	it	nonetheless	remains	a	procedure	that	puts	qualitative	experiences	and	
contributions	at	its	center.	For	Fichte,	in	this	regard	the	“creative	genius”	is	something	that	
should	be	encouraged	and	regarded	as	valuable,	rather	than	dismissed	as	impractical	or	out	of	
touch	with	true	knowledge.			
While	this	claim	is	interesting	on	its	own,	it	was	particularly	noteworthy	to	me	because	
contemporary	academia	takes	a	markedly	different	approach	to	knowledge	production.	Rather	
than	centering	imagination,	“creative	genius”,	and	qualitative	experience	in	its	scientific	
processes,	academic	research	is	organized	around	the	aforementioned	materialist	assumptions,	
Baconian	procedure,	and	production-based	outcomes.	Claims	of	truth	from	lived	experiences	
are	often	considered,	at	best,	insufficient,	and	at	worst,	inadmissible	because	this	form	of	data	
is	normatively	considered	to	be	more	biased	than	data	obtained	through	classical	Baconian	
procedures,	such	as	experimentation	within	the	natural	sciences.	In	addition,	students	are	
taught	to	be	receivers	of	information	and	are	often	not	encouraged	to	be	active	participants	in	
its	discovery.	Knowledge	is	something	that	is	externally	adsorbed	and	parroted,	not	
experienced	or	created.					
	 While	I	cede	that	there	is	value	in	these	procedures,	it	is	troubling	when	they	produce	
an	uncritical	valorization	of	the	natural	and	quantitative	sciences	at	the	expense	of	qualitative	
and	participatory	discovery.	Contrary	to	popular	mythos,	these	“realer”	sciences	are	not	
immune	from	bias	and	have	been	culturally	shaped	along	with	qualitative	forms	of	knowledge	
production.	Furthermore,	if	we	were	to	completely	accept	this	materialism,	there	would	be	no	
space	for	human	freedom,	rendering	us	mere	products	of	matter	and	denying	recognition	of	
our	exploratory	agency.	As	I	continued	reading	Fichte’s	work,	I	often	wondered	if	his	approach	
to	knowledge	production	might	be	able	to	offer	more	balance	to	these	methods,	offering	
alternative	approaches	for	the	broader	academic	community	that	would	synthesize	
opportunities	for	scientific	methodology	and	qualitative	experiences.	This	inquiry	is	what	I	have	
sought	to	explore	through	this	paper,	beginning	with	the	question:	if	he	wrote	on	the	matter,	
what	were	Fichte’s	perspectives	on	pedagogy?		
	
II.	Language,	Autonomy,	and	Manipulation:	Fichte’s	Relational	Pedagogy		
In	searching	for	potential	sources	on	Fichtean	pedagogy,	the	first	article	that	I	found	was	
written	by	Sean	Franzel	and	titled	“‘Welches	Gesetz	ist	der	Mensch	in	seiner	Wirksamkeit?’:	
Pedagogy	and	Media	in	Fichte’s	Encounter	with	Mesmerism.”	Franzel’s	piece	examines	the	
parallels	Fichte	perceived	among	the	relationships	between	mesmerists	with	their	patients,	and	
instructors	with	their	students.	While	the	article	offered	rich	and	complex	analyses	on	a	
multitude	of	topics,	much	of	it	initially	seemed	to	only	be	peripherally	related	to	my	specific	
Eri	Svenson	 	 														Fichtean	Approaches	to	Education	
	 8	
inquiry.	Fortunately,	I	was	able	to	recognize	on	closer	reexamination	that	nestled	among	this	
content	was	a	direct	and	salient	explanation	of	Fichte’s	pedagogical	approach.	The	authors	
write	that	“For	Fichte,	education	is	first	and	foremost	to	awaken	a	student’s	ability	to	think	
actively	and	freely”	(7),	a	perspective	he	grounded	in	a	fundamental	concern	for	freedom	and	
autonomy.		The	paper	goes	on	to	further	explain	that	Fichte	specifically	believed	that	reading	
only	lead	to	passive	learning,	and	so	instead	he	opted	to	utilize	interactional	and	experimental	
lectures,	engendering	his	students’	independent	thinking	through	relational	pedagogical	
approaches.	
Given	the	content	of	Fichte’s	metaphysical	philosophies,	learning	this	was	unsurprising	
to	me,	but	it	nonetheless	was	still	exciting	to	imagine	the	possibilities	for	learning	and	creativity	
that	such	a	classroom,	if	successful,	would	engender.	While	it	was	often	implicit	throughout	his	
groundbreaking	works,	his	pedagogical	philosophy	makes	it	clear	how	central	themes	of	agency	
are	to	him,	recognizing	the	inextricable	link	between	freedom	and	the	capacity	to	engage	in	
authentic	intellectual	discovery.	This	is	something	that	is	ignored	in	many	normative	forms	of	
instruction,	which	can	be	highly	dictatorial	and	inflexible.	Consequently,	students	never	truly	
experience	or	develop	a	sense	of	ownership	over	their	learning,	making	it	more	difficult	for	
them	to	value,	internalize,	and	contribute	to	the	knowledge	they	encounter.	They	become	
trained	to	accept	the	status	quo	and	struggle	to	become	aware	of	the	complexities	of	the	world	
they	experience	and	their	place	within	it.	By	seeking	to	facilitate	opportunities	for	guided,	
independent	study,	Fichte	flips	this	script,	respecting	his	students’	creative	processes,	giving	
them	the	necessary	tools	to	experience	truth	for	themselves,	and	opening	up	the	space	for	the	
dialectical	process	to	continue.		
Franzel’s	article	does,	however,	describe	instances	in	which	this	underlying	philosophy	
was	challenged	and	created	inner	conflicts	for	Fichte.	After	observing	a	mesmerist	patient	begin	
speaking	in	a	manner	that	seemed	out	of	her	control	under	the	influence	of	her	practitioner's	
words,	he	became	troubled	about	the	potential	manipulative	power	of	spoken	language.	
Rethinking	his	own	belief	in	the	freeing	capacities	of	oral	instruction,	he	was	reminded	of	
students	who	were	successful	at	an	activity	while	he	was	facilitating	it	for	them,	but	who	
quickly	lost	that	capacity	once	out	of	the	classroom.	The	power	of	the	relational	authority	
inherent	in	his	position	became	a	tension	for	him	as	his	deep	commitment	to	autonomy	and	
clashed	with	the	practical	realities	of	his	profession.	He	taught	so	that	his	students	could	learn	
to	engage	in	a	process	of	free	discovery	for	themselves,	but	he	was	bound	to	doing	so	in	a	way	
that	seemed	to	inherently	reduce	students’	autonomy.		
While	considering	Fichte’s	struggles	on	this	matter,	I	could	not	help	but	recognize	the	
relevancy	to	the	contemporary	academic	classroom.	Regardless	of	the	discipline,	it	has	become	
a	nearly	universal	experience	to	hear	faculty	express	frustration	over	the	difficulties	many	
students	have	when	expected	to	think	and	participate	without	direct	and	immediate	guidance.	
Even	with	this	guidance,	if	the	activity	asks	students	to	take	the	reins	on	their	rational	
capacities,	they	will	often	hesitate	or	even	stop	participating	altogether.	The	possibility	strikes	
me	that	many	of	these	faculty	likely	share	in	the	spirit	of	Fichte’s	aims	in	that	they	deeply	
respect	and	seek	to	bring	out	students’	own	critical	thoughts	but	are	then	forced	to	reconcile	
that	with	students	who	struggle	after	being	offered	intellectual	freedom.	If	an	instructor	
accepts	that	at	least	one	of	the	purposes	of	education	is	to	foster	students’	freedom	of	thought,	
it	seems	as	if	it	this	would	quickly	become	a	pressing	pedagogical	challenge	by	creating	a	
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conflict	between	one’s	intellectual,	professional,	and	moral	ideals,	and	the	lived	realities	of	the	
relationships	between	students,	their	instructors,	and	the	institutions	that	form	them.	
Even	based	within	my	own	experiences	as	a	student,	if	I	were	asked	to	imagine	what	an	
ideal	classroom	experience	would	be,	I	can	say	with	confidence	that	I	would	find	Fichte’s	
approach	inspiring,	but	I	am	only	cautiously	hopeful	about	the	possibility	of	it	being	realized	on	
a	broader	scale	after	having	watched	a	multitude	of	instructors	experiment	with	similar	
approaches	and	come	up	against	walls	that	were	seemingly	of	students’	own	creation.	If	we	
sincerely	are,	as	Fichte	posits,	agents	of	our	own	experience,	why	have	we	been	so	quick	to	
deny	it	and	cede	to	the	manipulative	power	of	others’	language?	Why	do	we	shy	away	from	
embracing	opportunities	to	take	agency	over	our	own	experiences	and	knowledge?	The	roots	
of	this	phenomenon	are	clearly	multifaceted,	and	I	would	not	seek	to	deny	the	complex	
assortment	of	relational,	intellectual,	and	sociocultural	dynamics	producing	them.	That	being	
said,	though	Fichte’s	relational	concerns	did	intuitively	resonate	with	me,	I	could	not	help	but	
think	about	what	else	might	be	shaping	this	experience.	
What	I	kept	coming	back	to	is	what,	at	least	in	contemporary	times,	we	have	been	
taught	about	the	purpose	of	scholarship.	Either	as	a	cause	itself	or	as	a	missed	opportunity	to	
generate	solutions,	the	value	of	our	inherent	imaginative	and	creative	capacities	is	rarely	given	
experiential	space.	We	are	increasingly	taught	that	our	education	is	merely	a	means	to	more	
imminently	“practical”	ends,	such	as	credentials	and	employable	skills.	The	arts,	literature,	and	
humanities	are	demeaned,	while	student	are	pushed	to	enter	technical	fields	regardless	of	their	
individual	preferences	or	aptitudes.	The	purpose	of	the	instructor	and	the	classroom	is	no	
longer	to	assist	students	in	fully	experiencing	their	freedom,	but	to	merely	prepare	them	for	
more	materially	functional	demands.	The	expectation	that	our	education	and	work	will	be	
hierarchal	and	rote	is	normalized,	and	we	dismiss	as	naïve	those	who	aspire	to	more	creative	
pursuits.	These	approaches	clearly	contradict	Fichte’s	pedagogical	philosophy	and	would	
prevent	its	incorporation	throughout	contemporary	academia.	Consequentially,	I	began	to	
wonder:	did	Fichte	provide	a	counter-perspective	to	this,	addressing	the	purpose	of	scholarship	
and	education	in	the	broader,	social	sense?	
	
III.	Scholarship,	Education,	and	Human	Progress:	Fichte’s	Scholarly	Vocation		
To	begin	exploring	this	question,	I	searched	for	sources	on	Fichte’s	“The	Scholar’s	
Vocation”,	a	series	of	lectures	articulating	his	perspectives	on	the	social	purpose	of	the	scholar	
and	their	work.	Written	by	David	James,	the	article	“Fichte	on	the	Vocation	of	the	Scholar	and	
the	(Mis)use	of	History”	provides	a	discussion	of	these	lectures.	While	James	is	specifically	
critical	of	Fichte’s	use	of	history	as	an	instrumental	tool,	he	offers	a	broader	discussion	of	his	
philosophies,	as	well.	According	to	the	article,	Fichte	believed	humans	have	been	tracked	onto	
a	series	of	predetermined	stages	of	development,	which	will	ultimately	culminate	in	a	perfect	
reflection	of	rationality.	At	the	time	of	his	lectures,	he	believed	that	humans	were	on	the	
precipice	of	entering	a	higher	stage	of	the	process,	and	that	it	was	the	scholar’s	moral	
obligation	to	grow	a	complete	understanding	of	history	and	philosophy	so	that	they	could	
facilitate	the	elevation.	For	Fichte,	the	purpose	of	scholarship	was	to	cultivate	the	capabilities	of	
humankind	as	progressive	beings.	
This	claim	should	not	be	mistaken	to	mean	that	he	did	not	also	recognize	the	pursuit	of	
truth	as	its	own	end;	as	articulated	in	his	pedagogical	philosophies,	such	a	value	is	in	actuality	at	
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the	heart	of	his	work.	Consequentially,	he	would	likely	respond	to	James’s	concerns	by	arguing	
that	his	use	of	history	as	an	instrument	should	not	be	taken	as	being	a	means	to	that	end	only	
or	that	its	integrity	would	be	sacrificed.	Rather,	his	claim	that	the	purpose	of	scholarship	is	in	
part	to	bring	about	human	progress	simply	grounds	the	scholarly	pursuit	of	truth	in	an	
additional,	broader	context.	In	its	essence,	“The	Scholar’s	Vocation”	articulates	the	social	
application	of	Fichte’s	metaphysical	and	pedagogical	philosophies.	Whereas	in	the	classroom	he	
sought	to	awaken	individual	students’	critical	capacities,	here	he	positions	that	individual	
growth	as	one	piece	of	a	larger	humanitarian	puzzle.	I	consider	the	most	meaningful	
contribution	of	this	insight	to	be	its	recognition	of	intellectual	exploration	as	a	moral	concern.	
The	strengthening	of	our	productive	imaginations	and	the	experiences	they	unlock	are	such	an	
innate	part	of	our	humanity	and	such	an	inextricable	part	of	our	quest	for	human	progress	that	
there	is	an	obligation	to	bring	those	skills	and	revelations	to	a	larger,	more	accessible	forum.	
Thinking	back	to	his	groundbreaking	metaphysical	philosophies,	I	would	suggest	this	task	should	
be	regarded	as	a	step	in	Fichte’s	project	to	reconceptualize	philosophy	as	a	participatory	
process,	rather	than	a	mere	argumentative	discipline,	as	it	takes	its	conclusions	into	the	public	
sphere	where	they	can	be	experiences	and	applied.	Through	this,	scholarship	itself	becomes	a	
public	good.		
This	provides	a	compelling	counter	perspective	to	the	growing	chorus	of	voices	decrying	
the	liberal	arts	as	disconnected	from	the	experiences	and	necessities	of	societies,	claiming	that	
liberal	arts	studies	merely	distract	from	“real”	work.	Of	course,	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	more	
“practical”	disciplines,	such	as	technology	or	trade	work,	are	not	of	human	value,	as	they	are	
vital	to	the	functioning	and	development	of	civilizations.	Rather,	what	this	is	said	to	suggest	is	
that	the	scholar’s	vocation	should	also	be	considered	an	uncompromisable	pillar	in	the	
activities	of	human	society.	While	building	roads	and	innovating	technology	help	us	advance	in	
production	and	trade,	it	is	through	the	embrace	of	intellectual	freedom	and	an	imaginative	
pursuit	of	truth	that	we	will	progress	in	our	humanity.	
After	“The	Scholar’s	Vocation”,	Fichte	gave	a	series	of	lectures	titled	“Addresses	to	the	
German	Nation”,	through	which	he	sought	to	inspire	an	increasingly	demoralized	and	faltering	
nation.	In	the	article	“Fichte	on	Education”,	G.	H.	Turnbell	highlights	the	central	place	that	
education	occupied	in	this	vision.	While	the	lectures	do	contain	a	form	of	nationalism	that	in	
historical	context	we	would	now	find	troubling,	I	believe	the	core	of	his	message	can	still	be	
abstracted	and	breathed	a	more	contemporary	life.	At	their	heart,	Fichte’s	addresses	advocated	
that	education	should	be	regarded	an	essential	foundation	for	a	successful	nation,	and	
consequentially	should	be	made	universally	accessible	to	all	regardless	of	their	class.	Rather	
than	to	create	a	skilled	workforce,	however,	Fichte’s	educational	vision	sought	to	develop	the	
innate	capacities	and	characteristics	necessary	for	humanity	to	reach	progressively	higher	
states.	Relegating	economic	efficiency	to	a	secondary	role,	the	spirit	of	this	system	was	a	
pedagogy	based	in	our	potential	as	whole,	free,	and	imaginative	beings,	capable	of	taking	
ownership	of	those	experiences	if	given	the	necessary	training	and	opportunity.	Thinking	back	
to	Fichte’s	trouble	with	his	students,	it	is	hard	for	me	to	imagine	that	a	nation	built	upon	such	a	
foundation,	valuing	intellectual	exploration	as	a	necessary	and	universal	right,	would	not	be	
more	likely	to	have	developed	the	classroom	experiences	he	was	seeking	for	his	students.	
	
IV.	Technology,	Economics,	and	Changing	Institutions:	Fichte’s	Modern	University		
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This	brings	us	to	my	project’s	final	question:	Where	do	we	go	from	here	and	can	Fichte	
help	us	get	there?	While	I	would	not	posit	to	have	a	definitive	answer,	I	can	look	back	at	where	
this	exploratory	process	has	taken	me.	Though	I	had	always	expected	to	find	material	that	
would	contribute	meaningfully	to	my	understanding	of	the	praxis	and	place	of	academia,	I	
could	not	have	anticipated	it	would	be	so	imminently	salient	to	the	conversations	we	are	having	
now.	From	his	struggles	in	the	classroom	to	his	educational	visions,	it	has	become	clear	that	the	
conflicts	and	potentials	of	Fichte’s	ideals	are	very	much	alive	and	poised	for	our	present	
moment.	
This	is,	furthermore,	no	coincidence.	Writing	in	the	Chronicle	for	Higher	Education,	Chad	
Wellmon	reveals	that	Fichte	was	facing	a	landscape	not	entirely	dissimilar	to	our	own.	At	the	
time	of	Fichte’s	writing,	the	recent	development	of	the	printing	press	was	making	texts	
accessible	to	a	degree	not	previously	possible,	rapidly	expanding	the	percentage	of	the	literate	
public	that	could	access	them.	Prior	to	this	point,	universities	had	functioned	primarily	as	“oral	
substitutes”	for	books	that	would	have	otherwise	only	been	available	in	small,	scattered	
libraries.	With	the	printing	press,	however,	this	oral	practice	was	no	longer	necessary,	and	
consequentially	the	basic	purpose	of	the	university	was	being	called	into	question.	Many	were	
arguing	that	academia	should	abandon	its	place	as	a	home	for	ideas	entirely,	as	they	were	no	
longer	seen	as	economically	relevant,	and	academia	should	instead	transform	into	highly	
specialized	vocational	schools.	Fichte,	however,	advocated	against	this,	proposing	a	model	that	
would	place	free,	intellectual	exploration	at	its	heart:	the	university,	according	to	him,	should	
become	a	place	where	those	with	specialized	disciplinary	knowledge	could	go	to	teach,	
experiment,	and	create	new	ideas,	rather	than	simply	recite	existing	ones.	This	vision	would	
become	the	basis	for	the	university	system	we	know	today.		
The	internet	has	catalyzed	society	in	previously	unfathomable	directions,	making	
information	and	learning	accessible	in	ways	that	it	never	was	before.	Idea	exchanges	that	were	
once	considered	the	hallmark	of	the	academic	institution	are	now	happening	throughout	the	
web,	and	each	new	technological	advance	drives	the	need	for	workers	skilled	in	developing	and	
implementing	them.	As	it	was	then,	politicians,	administrators,	and	consumers	are	increasingly	
calling	us	to	step	back	from	intellectual	discoveries,	marking	the	current	model	of	instruction	
obsolete,	and	advocating	for	the	creation	of	technical,	skill-based	universities.	Even	within	my	
own	institution,	I	have	become	increasingly	conscious	of	and	disheartened	to	hear	
conversations	about	innovative	pedagogical	proposals	turn	into	nothing	but	an	assessment	of	
their	impact	on	completion,	retention,	and	employability.	While	these	outcomes	are	undeniably	
important,	the	most	meaningful	academic	experiences	I	have	had,	the	ones	that	inspired	me	
and	caused	me	to	grow	as	a	thinker,	have	been	those	that	have	taken	place	in	classrooms	that	
sought	to	be	laboratories	for	discussion	and	discovery,	not	those	that	imparted	to	me	skills	
which	I	could	list	on	a	resume.	Furthermore,	as	I	have	entered	deeper	into	the	workforce,	it	is	
the	creative	and	synthetic	abilities	I	developed	in	these	classrooms	that	have	most	contributed	
to	my	professional	success.		
In	his	article,	Wellmon	argues	that	Fichte’s	innovations	and	their	parallels	to	the	
contemporary	moment	should	help	us	recognize	the	value	in	keeping	academia	as	it	is.	By	doing	
so,	we	will	be	able	to	ensure	that	scholarship’s	free	exchange	and	creation	of	ideas	is	protected	
from	the	societal	currents	seeking	to	question	its	basic	value.		Though	I	concur	with	the	
importance	of	this	latter	mission,	I	respectfully	disagree	with	Wellmon’s	conclusions.	Rather	
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than	as	a	reason	to	remain	stagnant,	the	message	of	his	article	ought	instead	to	be	that,	in	the	
face	of	changing	circumstances,	we	must	remain	willing	and	able	to	reimagine	our	purpose;	if	
we	don’t,	our	home	of	ideas	might	be	devalued	entirely.	With	academia	once	more	at	this	
precipice	of	change,	however,	Fichte’s	philosophies	should	remind	us	that	this	reimagining	does	
not	have	to	come	at	the	expense	of	our	inalienable	pursuit	of	creativity,	imagination,	and	truth.	
Though	we	might	be	required	to	change,	we	should	be	thinking	about	how	to	do	so	in	ways	that	
allow	us	to	preserve	the	spirit	of	our	institution:	institutions	that	value	intellectual	exploration	
for	its	own	sake,	while	also	recognizing	that	without	intellectual	exploration	we	cannot	discover	
knowledge	or	imagine	greater	possibilities	for	human	beings.	Far	from	being	distractions,	in	an	
information	age	increasingly	overwhelmed	with	falsities	and	subsumed	with	bottom	lines,	
preserving	these	values	is	more	important	than	ever	before.	Rather	than	reimaging	the	
university	as	a	technical	institute,	we	can	reimagine	it	as	a	space	that	encourages	opportunities	
for	relational	pedagogy,	experiential	pursuits	of	truth,	and	generations	of	new	knowledge	and	
ideas.		
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